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In 2017, Katelin Seo told the Hamilton County Sheriff’s 
Department that D.S. raped her.1 With Seo’s consent, a detective 
viewed and downloaded her iPhone’s contents.2 
Based on the phone’s contents, the detective decided not to file 
charges against D.S. and instead began investigating Seo for 
stalking and harassing D.S.3 The detective spoke with D.S., who 
said Seo called and texted him numerous times each day, 
sometimes up to thirty times in one day.4 
Later that month, Seo was arrested for stalking and harassing 
D.S.5 When police arrested Seo, they seized her phone and asked 
her for the password.6 Although they had a warrant for the phone, 
Seo refused to divulge her password.7 So the State was in a bind:  
it had legally seized a phone that it could not search because the 
phone was locked and passcode protected.8 
This scenario is not unique to Hamilton County. Law 
enforcement agencies across the country struggle with what to do 
when they legally seize a phone and have court permission to 
search that phone but are unable to because it is locked. 
Ultimately, the solution is to compel the suspect to unlock  
the phone. The suspect, however, can counter with a  
Fifth Amendment claim: if the government compels the suspect to 
unlock the phone, it may be unconstitutionally requiring the 
suspect to self-incriminate. 
In some jurisdictions, courts have addressed this issue and 
established protocol for how to constitutionally compel a suspect  
to unlock a phone.9 In other jurisdictions, however, this issue 
remains unresolved, leaving law enforcement and prosecutors 
without clear guidance. 
This paper offers recommendations for law enforcement and 
prosecutors in jurisdictions where there is no binding caselaw on 
 
 1. Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 953 (Ind. 2020). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 953–54. 
 6. Id. at 954. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra notes 180, 221, 297, 313, and accompanying text. 
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this issue. Part II is an overview of passcodes and how they protect 
phone content. Part III is an explanation of relevant United States 
Supreme Court precedent on the privilege against self-
incrimination. Part IV introduces the pertinent legal questions and 
explains how some lower courts have addressed this issue. Part V 
recommends how to successfully get court permission to compel 
suspects to unlock their phones. 
I. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
Before delving into the legal issues, it is helpful to understand 
the technology behind phone passcodes. Understanding how 
passcodes work helps explain why this issue has developed, what 
options law enforcement has, and the different legal issues lawyers 
and courts must consider. This section will give an overview of 
(A) the different types of phone passcodes, (B) what it means for a 
device to be “encrypted,” and (C) the possibility of using 
technology to forcibly unlock a passcode-protected phone. 
A. Phone Passcodes 
With smartphones, users can create passcodes that lock and 
unlock their phones.10 Passcodes are typically a personal 
identification number (PIN), an alphanumeric password, or a 
biometric feature.11 
A PIN is a four- or six-digit passcode.12 If a phone is PIN 
protected, users unlock the phone by entering a previously selected 
string of digits.13 An alphanumeric password is like a PIN  
but allows users to create a passcode that includes both digits  
and letters.14 
 
 10. Tahir Musa Ibrahim, Shafi’i Muhammad Abdulhamid, Ala Abdusalam Alarood, 
Haruna Chiroma, Mohammed Ali Al-garadi, Nadim Rana, Amina Nuhu Muhammad, 
Adamu Abubakar, Khalid Haruna & Lubna A. Gabralla, Recent Advances in Mobile  
Touch Screen Security Authentication Methods: A Systematic Literature Review, 85 COMPUTS. &  
SEC. 1, 2 (2019). 
 11. Id. at 3–7. 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Stop Using 6-Digit iPhone Passcodes, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 16, 2018, 11:56 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59jq8a/ 
how-to-make-a-secure-iphone-passcode-6-digits. 
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Biometrics are unique physical attributes used for identification 
and authentication.15 Common biometric authentication methods 
for phones are fingerprint, facial, and iris.16 For example, users can 
scan their thumbprints into their phone.17 When the phone is 
locked, users scan their thumb again; if the new scan matches the 
previously stored scan, the phone will unlock.18 This process is 
called “one-to-one matching” because the phone is comparing a 
current sample to a previously made sample.19 
B. Phone Encryption 
In addition to passcodes, smartphones increasingly use 
encryption to protect data while the phone is locked.20 When a 
phone is encrypted, its contents21 (plaintext) are converted to 
unintelligible characters (ciphertext).22 A decryption key is 
necessary to change the contents from ciphertext to plaintext and 
vice versa.23 A decryption key is composed of “bits,” which are 
strings of zeros and ones.24 Decryption keys are typically 128- or 
256-bits long and automatically generated by the phone’s 
software.25 While a 256-bit key has significantly more possible keys 
than a 128-bit key, both have an “unimaginably large number[]” of 
possible keys and are thus considered uncrackable.26 
Importantly, the phone’s passcode is not the decryption key.27 
Rather, the passcode is a way to release the more complex 
 
 15. What Are Biometrics?, BIOMETRICS INST., https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/ 
what-is-biometrics/faqs/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 16. Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric 
Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 653, 655 (2003). 
 17. Id. at 655–56. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 
990 (2018). 
 21. “Contents” includes text, images, videos, and programs. Id. at 993. 
 22. Michael Price & Zach Simonetti, Defending Device Decryption Cases, CHAMPION, 
July 2019, at 42. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Kerr & Schneier, supra note 20, at 993. 
 25. Id. at 993–94. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 995. 
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encryption key.28 When a user enters the correct passcode,  
the phone accesses the decryption key, which then decrypts the 
device.29 Thus, every time users lock their phones they also encrypt 
their phones’ content.30 When they unlock their phones, the content 
is automatically decrypted.31 This process is invisible to users.32 
The difference between locking and encrypting a device is 
subtle but significant. Locking a phone is like locking a file room’s 
door; if you can find another way into the room—through a 
window, perhaps—the contents of the files are the same as if you 
had unlocked and entered through the door.33 However, imagine 
that the door is locked and the files are shredded—that is an 
encrypted device.34 In practice, this means that law enforcement 
can potentially access the contents of a locked, but not encrypted, 
phone by removing and accessing the storage device with 
laboratory equipment.35 If the phone is encrypted, however, law 
enforcement will only see unintelligible data.36 For simplicity’s 
sake, unless otherwise noted, when this Note refers to unlocking a 
phone it also means decrypting an encrypted phone.37 
C. Breaking into Locked Phones 
Of course, the simplest solution to this problem, in criminal 
investigations, is for suspects to voluntarily unlock their phones.38 
 
 28. Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 
87 FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 221 (2018). 
 29. Id. at 222. 
 30. See id. at 221. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Kerr & Schneier, supra note 20, at 994. 
 33. See Price & Simonetti, supra note 22, at 43 (“For example, early iPhones could be 
‘locked,’ but they did not encrypt the data inside, making it possible to read user contents by 
bypassing the lock.”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Sacharoff, supra note 28, at 221. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Because nearly all smartphones now use encryption, the distinction is not often 
necessary to point out. Id. 
 38. Potentially, if a phone is protected by biometrics, law enforcement could attempt 
to use the suspect’s biometrics without the suspect’s permission. For example, an officer 
could hold a phone protected by facial identification up to a suspect’s face. This does, 
however, raise a Fourth Amendment concern over whether the state has illegally seized the 
suspect’s biometric features. This Note will not cover that issue, but for a discussion of the 
topic see Opher Shweiki & Youli Lee, Compelled Use of Biometric Keys to Unlock a Digital Device: 
Deciphering Recent Legal Developments, 67 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 23, 25–34 (2019). 
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While some suspects may do so, it is unlikely that they will for a 
variety of reasons—including a reluctance to self-incriminate and a 
belief that the Constitution protects their noncompliance. Whatever 
the reason, when users refuse to unlock their phones, law 
enforcement can try to force the phone to unlock, so long as they 
have legally seized the phone. The likely success of this approach 
depends on the type of passcode protecting the phone. 
1. Phones protected by PINs and alphanumeric passwords 
PINs and alphanumeric passwords are designed in such a way 
that the fastest way to break into the phone is through a brute-force 
attack.39 A brute-force attack entails attempting every possible 
passcode until the phone unlocks.40 The longer the code, the longer 
a brute-force attack will take.41 To prevent brute-force attacks, 
many phone security systems have escalating time delays after a 
user enters an invalid passcode.42 These systems also let users 
enable an option that erases the phone’s content after a certain 
amount of incorrect entries.43 For example, the current iPhone 
operating system requires a user to wait one minute before entering 
a passcode after five failed attempts.44 That delay escalates to one 
hour after nine failed attempts.45 If the “Erase Data” function is 
turned on, the device automatically erases all data after ten 
consecutive failed attempts.46 
In the past, law enforcement has had difficulty breaking  
four- and six-digit PINs. For example, in 2015, gunmen killed 
fourteen people in San Bernardino, California.47 The FBI believed 
that one of the gunmen’s phones contained important evidence, 
which the FBI could not access because the phone was protected by 
 
 39. Kerr & Schneier, supra note 20, at 994. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (“Adding a single bit to the encryption key only slightly increases the amount 
of work necessary to encrypt, but doubles the amount of work necessary to brute-force attack 
the algorithm.”). 
 42. Id. at 1000. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Passcodes, APPLE INC., https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-
sec20230a10d/1/web/1 (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Mike Isaac, Explaining Apple’s Fight with the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/explaining-apples-fight-with-the-fbi.html. 
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a four-digit passcode.48 A legal battle between Apple and the FBI 
ensued, and a federal court ordered Apple to unlock the iPhone.49 
Apple refused and, before scheduled court proceedings, a third 
party found a way to unlock the phone for the FBI.50 To Apple’s 
chagrin, the FBI refused to divulge how the third party unlocked 
the phone.51 
Since the Apple-FBI standoff, passcodes have become more 
susceptible to brute-force attacks.52 Law enforcement relies on two 
companies to break into phones: Cellebrite and Grayshift.53 
Cellebrite is an Israeli-owned company that claims it can unlock 
phones running up to Android 10 and iOS 13.3.x, as well as devices 
manufactured by Motorola, LG, Sony, Nokia, and other 
companies.54 Cellebrite sells “on-premise” devices, meaning that 
law enforcement officers can purchase Cellebrite technology  
and use it themselves.55 Because this technology is sold only to  
law enforcement, it is hard to know the exact cost, but most 
estimates show prices ranging from $2,499 to $15,999, depending 
on the model.56 
Some agencies also use GrayKey, a device manufactured by 
Grayshift. Grayshift has publicly advertised its ability to crack a 
four-digit iPhone passcode in six-and-a-half to thirteen minutes.57 
If that number is accurate, it would take, on average, 22.2 hours to 
crack a 6-digit passcode, 92.5 days to crack an 8-digit passcode, and 
 
 48. Id.; Chris Fox & Dave Lee, Apple Rejects Order to Unlock Gunman’s Phone, BBC NEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35594245. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Katie Benne, John Markoff & Nicole Perlroff, Apple’s New Challenge: Learning How 
the U.S. Cracked Its iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/ 
30/technology/apples-new-challenge-learning-how-the-us-cracked-its-iphone.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 14. 
 53. Price & Simonetti, supra note 22, at 47. 
 54. Cellebrite Premium, CELLEBRITE, https://www.cellebrite.com/en/ufed-premium/ 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 55. Unlock and Extract Critical Mobile Data in Your Agency with Cellebrite’s Premium, 
CELLEBRITE, https://www.cellebrite.com/en/cellebrite-premium-2/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 56. Product Information: Cellebrite UFED Series, SC MEDIA (Oct. 1, 2015), 
https://www.scmagazine.com/review/cellebrite-ufed-series/. 
 57. Researcher Estimates GrayKey Can Unlock 6-Digit iPhone Passcode in 11 Hours, Here’s 
How to Protect Yourself, APPLEINSIDER (Apr. 16, 2018), https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/ 
04/16/researcher-estimates-graykey-can-unlock-a-6-digit-iphone-passcode-in-11-hours-
heres-how-to-protect-yourself. 
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25.4 years to crack a 10-digit passcode.58 In comparison, it would 
take five to six years to crack a six-character alphanumeric 
password.59 Like Cellebrite, GrayKey is sold only to law 
enforcement and is an on-premise device that officers can use 
themselves.60 One GrayKey model permits 300 uses and costs 
$15,000; another model allows unlimited uses and costs $30,000.61 
Unlike Cellebrite, GrayKey only works on Apple devices.62 Further, 
GrayKey can only unlock some versions of iOS 12 and lower.63 
In response to these technologies, phone manufacturers 
develop better security systems.64 For example, in 2018, Apple 
announced a software update that automatically disables the 
phone’s charging port an hour after the phone is locked.65 Because 
code-breaking devices plug into the charging port, this software 
update thwarts those devices.66 Apple claimed that the update was 
not an attempt to “frustrate” law enforcement, but a way “to help 
customers defend against hackers, identity thieves and intrusions 
into their personal data.”67 Since the update, Cellebrite, but  
not Grayshift, has developed technology to work around that 
 
 58. @matthew_d_green, TWITTER (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:17 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
matthew_d_green/status/985885001542782978?lang=en. Green is an associate professor 
and cryptographer at the Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute. Matthew D. Green, 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://isi.jhu.edu/~mgreen/. 
 59. Julia P. Eckart, The Department of Justice Versus Apple Inc.: The Great Encryption 
Debate Between Privacy and National Security, 27 CATH. U.J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2019). 
 60. GrayKey, GRAYSHIFT, https://graykey.grayshift.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 61. Thomas Brewster, Mysterious $15,000 ‘GrayKey’ Promises to Unlock iPhone X for the 
Feds, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/ 
2018/03/05/apple-iphone-x-graykey-hack/#6188c0fb2950. 
 62. Andy Greenberg, Cellebrite Says It Can Unlock Any iPhone for Cops, WIRED  
(June 14, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/cellebrite-ufed-ios-12-iphone-
hack-android/. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Jack Nicas, Apple to Close iPhone Security Hole That Law Enforcement Uses to Crack 
Devices, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/technology/ 
apple-iphone-police.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Roger Fingas, Apple Confirms iOS 12’s ‘USB Restricted Mode’ Will Thwart  
Police, Criminal Access, APPLEINSIDER (June 13, 2018), https://appleinsider.com/articles/ 
18/06/13/apple-confirms-ios-12s-usb-restricted-mode-designed-to-thwart-spies-criminals-
police-seizures; Heather Kelly, Apple Closes Law Enforcement Loophole for the iPhone, CNN BUS. 
(June 14, 2018, 5:35 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/13/technology/apple-iphone-
law-enforcement/index.html. 
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software update.68 This cycle resembles a cat-and-mouse game 
where phone companies develop new software that seems 
impermeable, a forensics company develops a workaround, the 
phone manufacture creates a fix, and so on.69 
2. Phones protected by biometrics 
In addition to passcodes, many phones are protected by 
biometrics. The three most common types for phones are 
fingerprint, facial, and iris identification. 
Fingerprint identification, also called touch identification, 
unlocks a phone when a “live” fingerprint placed on a sensor 
matches a previously stored mathematical representation of that 
fingerprint.70 To create a stored mathematical representation, users 
repeatedly place different sections of their fingerprint on the 
phone’s sensor.71 Because the sensor is smaller than the average 
adult fingerprint, these repeated placements allow the phone to 
gather a complete representation of the fingerprint.72 However, 
when users later unlock their phones, only a section of their 
fingerprint is actually sensed.73 This means that phones unlock by 
comparing a smaller portion of a “live” fingerprint to a complete, 
stored representation.74 
Similar to fingerprint identification, facial identification works 
by comparing a “live” image of someone’s face to a previously 
stored image.75 The images are compared for mathematical, and not 
just pictorial, likeness.76 For example, Apple’s Face ID uses over 
30,000 infrared dots to form a “depth map” that is a mathematical 
representation of the face.77 It also requires that the user’s attention 
be directed at the device.78 Apple claims that facial identification is 
 
 68. Greenberg, supra note 62. 
 69. Id. 
 70. About Touch ID Advanced Security Technology, APPLE INC. (Sept. 11, 2017) 
[hereinafter About Touch ID], https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE INC. (Feb. 26, 2020) [hereinafter About 
Face ID], https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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more secure than fingerprint identification; it says the likelihood  
of a random person looking at an iPhone protected by Face ID  
and unlocking it are 1 in 1,000,00079 (compared to 1 in 50,000  
for Touch ID).80 
Iris identification is a less popular biometric-identification 
method.81 Iris identification uses an infrared light to take a high-
resolution image of an iris.82 If the image matches a previously 
stored image, the phone unlocks.83 Samsung, which makes phones 
with iris scanners, claims that “because virtually no two irises are 
alike as well as being almost impossible to replicate, scanning your 
irises is a fool-proof method of mobile security.”84 
Unlike PINs or alphanumeric passwords, biometrics cannot be 
“guessed” through a brute-force attack. However, biometrics can 
sometimes be replicated and the phone “tricked” into unlocking. 
For example, a German hacking group claimed it unlocked an 
iPhone 5s with a fake finger created from a photograph of the user’s 
fingerprint on a glass surface.85 Likewise, researchers at New York 
University and Michigan State University claimed they made fake 
fingerprints composed of common features that could unlock 
phones up to sixty-five percent of the time.86 However, these fake 
fingerprints were not tested on actual phones, and other 
 
 79. However, the “statistical probability is different for twins and siblings that look 
like you and among children under the age of 13, because their distinct facial features may 
not have fully developed.” Id. 
 80. About Touch ID, supra note 70. But see JV Chamary, No, Apple’s Face ID Is Not a 
‘Secure Password’, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jvchamary/2017/09/18/security-apple-face-id-iphone-x/#30063e4d4c83 (claiming there is 
“no real evidence to prove [Face ID] is more secure”). 
 81. Many phones, like iPhones, do not have iris scanners, possibly because they do 
not work well with screen protectors, contacts, and glasses. Comparison: iPhone X vs. Galaxy 
Note 8 Biometrics, APPLEINSIDER (Dec. 11, 2017), https://appleinsider.com/articles/17/12/ 
11/comparison-iphone-x-vs-galaxy-note-8-biometrics. 
 82. Iris Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.eff.org/ 
pages/iris-recognition. 
 83. Id. 
 84. How Does the Iris Scanner Work on Galaxy S9, Galaxy S9+, and Galaxy Note9?, 
SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/global/galaxy/what-is/iris-scanning/ (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2020). 
 85. Chaos Computer Club Breaks Apple TouchID, CHAOS COMPUT. CLUB (Sept. 21, 2013, 
10:04 PM), https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid. 
 86. Aditi Roy, Nasir Memon & Arun Ross, MasterPrint: Exploring the Vulnerability of 
Partial Fingerprint-Based Authentication Systems, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. FORENSICS 
& SEC. 9, 2013–25 (Sept. 2017). 
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researchers expect the unlock rate would be much lower in  
real-world conditions.87 These examples show that breaking into a 
fingerprint-protected phone is possible, but victory is 
unpredictable and expensive. 
Groups have also had success with fake faces and eyes. For 
example, Forbes used a three-dimensional, printed head to break 
into four different phones running Android.88 The fake head did 
not work on iPhones.89 A different researcher, however, was able to 
fool an iPhone X’s Face ID using a three-dimensional printer, 
silicone, and paper tape.90 Similarly, a hacking group posted a 
video of its members unlocking an iris-protected Samsung phone 
by creating a “dummy eye” with a digital photograph, office 
printer, and contact lens.91 
Importantly, there are often restrictions on when biometrics 
will unlock a phone. For example, Motorola phones require users 
to enter a PIN or password if the phone has been locked for 
seventy-two hours, has restarted, or has unsuccessfully read a 
fingerprint five times.92 Likewise, iPhone Touch ID and Face ID will 
not work if, among other reasons, there have been five unsuccessful 
reading attempts, the phone has been locked for forty-eight hours, 
or the phone has just turned on.93 
In sum, locked phones are not impenetrable. However, 
breaking into a locked phone is impractical for three reasons:  
(1) it is expensive, (2) it takes time, and (3) the technology is 
 
 87. Vindu Goel, That Fingerprint Sensor on Your iPhone Is Not as Safe as You Think,  
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/technology/ 
fingerprint-security-smartphones-apple-google-samsung.html. 
 88. This process requires fifty cameras, which take pictures of the model’s head, and 
software to compile all of the pictures. Thomas Brewster, We Broke Into a Bunch of Android 
Phones With a 3D–Printed Head, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/12/13/we-broke-into-a-bunch-of-
android-phones-with-a-3d-printed-head/#18bd796f1330. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Mai Nguyen, Vietnamese Researcher Shows iPhone X Face ID ‘Hack’,  
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-vietnam-
hack/vietnamese-researcher-shows-iphone-x-face-id-hack-idUSKBN1DE1TH. 
 91. Hacking the Samsung Galaxy S8 Irisscanner, CHAOS COMPUT. CLUB (May 23, 2017), 
https://media.ccc.de/v/biometrie-s8-iris-en. 
 92. Use Fingerprint Security—Moto G Plus 4th Generation, MOTOROLA, 
https://support.motorola.com/us/en/solution/MS110999 (last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 93. About Face ID, supra note 75; About Touch ID, supra note 70. 
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constantly changing. For those reasons, law enforcement agencies 
may choose to try compelling suspects to unlock their phones. 
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”94 
This privilege is triggered only when someone is “[1] compelled 
[2] to make a testimonial communication [3] that is 
incriminating.”95 In compelled-phone-unlock cases, both parties 
often agree that the passcode was compelled and is incriminating.96 
Thus, the issue in these cases is usually whether unlocking  
a phone is a testimonial communication. The sections below 
describe how the United States Supreme Court has defined 
“testimonial communication.” 
A. Testimonial Communications 
In order to be testimonial, a communication must, “explicitly or 
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”97 
Likewise, testimonial communications require individuals to 
express the contents of their minds.98 For that reason, the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not implicated when suspects give a 
blood sample,99 stand in a lineup,100 or wear certain clothing.101 
Although these actions may be compelled and incriminating,  
 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 95. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
 96. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Here, the Government appears to concede, 
as it should, that the decryption and production are compelled and incriminatory.”). 
Prosecutors are likely to concede that the act is incriminating because even non-inculpatory 
communications are incriminating if they “furnish a link in the chain of evidence” needed to 
prosecute. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also United States v. 
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000) (“It has, however, long been settled that [the Fifth 
Amendment’s] protection encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of 
incriminating evidence even though the statements themselves are not incriminating and are 
not introduced into evidence.”). 
 97. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). 
 98. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). 
 99. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). 
 100. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1967). 
 101. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910). 
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they are not testimonial communications because they do not 
require individuals to reveal the contents of their minds.102 
While defining and clarifying the meaning of testimonial 
communication, the Supreme Court has articulated two important 
doctrines: the act-of-production doctrine and the foregone-
conclusion doctrine. 
1. The act-of-production doctrine 
When suspects hand over documents, they are making  
a testimonial communication—wholly independent from  
the documents’ contents—that they have possession, control,  
and ownership over those documents.103 This is the  
act-of-production doctrine.104 
For example, the government may subpoena suspects’ diaries, 
believing that those diaries contain evidence of a crime. The entries 
in the diaries are most certainly testimonial communications. 
Putting that aside, however, if the suspects surrender their diaries, 
they would also be making testimonial communications—through 
the act of production—that they own those diaries, have possession 
of those diaries, and that those diaries are the ones the government 
requested.105 As the Supreme Court put it, “[t]he act of producing 
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has 
communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents 
of the papers produced.”106 
2. The foregone-conclusion doctrine 
If the government already knows the information conveyed, 
however, the act of production is not a testimonial 
communication.107 This is called the “foregone-conclusion 
doctrine” because suspects add “little or nothing to the sum total of 
the Government’s information” by producing the requested 
information.108 In other words, if the information that suspects 
 
 102. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765; Wade, 388 U.S. at 221–22; Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–53. 
 103. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 411. 
 108. Id. 
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communicate through the act of production is already known by 
the government, the suspects are simply surrendering 
information—not testifying.109 
Returning to the example from above, presume that the 
government can independently prove that the suspects own and 
have control over the requested diaries. In that case, any potential 
testimonial communication is a foregone conclusion, and the  
Fifth Amendment is not implicated.110 
3. U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
The Supreme Court first articulated the act-of-production and 
foregone-conclusion doctrines in United States v. Fisher. The Court 
applied these doctrines again in United States v. Doe and United 
States v. Hubbell. A description of the facts and holdings of each case 
is helpful to understanding how the Supreme Court identifies 
testimonial communications. 
a. United States v. Fisher.  
In Fisher, Internal Revenue agents interviewed taxpayers 
suspected of violating federal income tax laws.111 After the 
interviews, the taxpayers collected tax documents from their 
accountants and sent the documents to their lawyers.112 When the 
IRS served summonses on the lawyers for those documents, the 
lawyers refused to comply, claiming, in part, that turning over  
the documents would force the taxpayers to compulsorily 
incriminate themselves.113 
The Court’s analysis focused on whether the documents were a 
testimonial communication by the taxpayers. The Court  
reiterated that “the privilege protects a person only against  
being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial 
communications.”114 Although compelling taxpayers to produce an 
accountant’s workpapers “without doubt involves substantial 
compulsion,” the actual creation of the workpapers was not 
compelled.115 Further, the taxpayers were not being forced to reveal 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally id. at 393–94. 
 111. Id. at 394. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 394–95. 
 114. Id. at 409. 
 115. Id. at 409–10. 
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the contents of their minds because they were not compelled to 
“restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents 
sought.”116 Since the tax documents were prepared by accountants, 
and did not contain any testimonial declarations by the taxpayers, 
the Court held that the taxpayers could not claim the documents 
were their testimony.117 
Yet the Court recognized that compliance with the subpoena 
“concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their 
possession or control by the taxpayer.”118 In other words,  
by producing the documents, the taxpayers would be testifying 
that the documents exist, are the documents requested, and are in 
their possession.119 
Ultimately, however, the Court decided that producing the 
documents would not be a testimonial communication.120 This was 
because the “existence and location of the papers are a foregone 
conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total 
of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has 
the papers.”121 By complying with the subpoena, the taxpayers 
were not communicating any information to the government that 
the government did not already know.122 So the Fifth Amendment 
did not protect the taxpayers from producing the documents.123 
b. United States v. Doe.  
In Doe, a grand jury subpoenaed bank records from Doe,  
its target.124 Doe surrendered some records but invoked the  
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for other 
records.125 When the government subpoenaed banks for those 
records, the banks refused, citing bank-secrecy laws.126 In response, 
the government asked the district court to order Doe to sign consent 
forms.127 These forms applied to “any and all accounts over which 
 
 116. Id. at 409. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 410. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 410–11. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 414. 
 124. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 202 (1988). 
 125. Id. at 202–03. 
 126. Id. at 203. 
 127. Id. at 203–04. 
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Doe had a right of withdrawal, without acknowledging  
the existence of any such account.”128 The district court, after an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, ordered Doe  
to sign the form.129 When Doe refused to sign, he was held in  
civil contempt; this sanction was stayed pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision.130 
At the Supreme Court, Doe claimed that signing the forms 
would be an incriminating, testimonial communication.131 The 
Court, however, held that by signing and executing the forms Doe 
would not be communicating, explicitly or implicitly, any factual 
assertions or conveying any information to the government.132 This 
was because the consent forms, by speaking in the hypothetical and 
not referring to specific accounts, did not acknowledge that the 
accounts actually existed or were controlled by Doe.133 Ultimately, 
by signing the forms, Doe would not be making any statement 
about the existence of the bank accounts or his control over  
those accounts.134 
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued that a suspect “may in some 
cases be forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing 
incriminating documents” but may not be forced to “reveal the 
combination to his wall safe.”135 The problem with the latter, he 
argued, is that it requires a suspect to “use his mind to assist the 
Government in developing its case.”136 For Justice Stevens, 
requiring Doe to execute the consent forms is akin to requiring him 
to reveal a safe combination.137 
In a footnote, the majority said it did not “disagree with the 
dissent that ‘[t]he expression of the contents of an individual’s 
mind’ is testimonial communication for purposes of the  
Fifth Amendment.”138 It did, however, feel that what the 
 
 128. Id. at 204. 
 129. Id. at 205–06. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 207. 
 132. Id. at 215. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 215–16. 
 135. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9. 
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government requested was more like asking Doe for a key than a 
safe combination.139 
Thus, signing the form was non-testimonial and the Fifth 
Amendment did not protect Doe.140 
c. United States v. Hubbell.  
In Hubbell, Webster Hubbell, a member of the Whitewater 
Development Corporation, pled guilty to mail fraud and tax 
evasion.141 As part of that plea, Hubbell “promised to provide the 
Independent Counsel with ‘full, complete, accurate, and truthful 
information’ about matters relating to the Whitewater 
investigation.”142 To see if Hubbell was complying with that 
promise, the Independent Counsel subpoenaed eleven different 
categories of documents; Hubbell provided those documents, 
which a grand jury used to charge Hubbell with other crimes.143 The 
district court, however, dismissed the indictment after determining 
that the act-of-production doctrine protected Hubbell.144 The case 
made its way to the Supreme Court.145 
The Court decided that Hubbell was constitutionally protected 
from complying with the subpoena.146 It held that the government’s 
request in this instance violated Hubbell’s privilege against  
self-incrimination because the information it asked for was not a 
“foregone conclusion.”147 Unlike in Fisher, where the government 
could independently prove the existence and authenticity of the 
requested documents, the government here had no prior 
knowledge of the documents that Hubbell produced in response to 
the subpoena.148 Indeed, the subpoena asked for such a breadth of 
information that the prosecutor “needed [Hubbell’s] assistance 
both to identify potential sources of information and to produce 
those sources.”149 This communicated facts not already known to 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 217. 
 141. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 30 (2000). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 31. 
 144. Id. at 31–32. 
 145. Id. at 34. 
 146. Id. at 45–46. 
 147. Id. at 44. 
 148. Id. at 44–45. 
 149. Id. at 41. 
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the government150 and required Hubbell “to make extensive use of 
the contents of his own mind.”151 Accordingly, his act of production 
was testimonial, and the Fifth Amendment protected him.152 
In sum, the government cannot compel individuals to make 
self-incriminating, testimonial communications. While this 
protection is limited to factual assertions that convey information, 
it includes acts of production that reveal new information to  
the government. 
III. APPLYING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO COMPELLED  
PHONE UNLOCKS153 
Given the reality of how difficult it is to unlock a phone, law 
enforcement may try compelling suspects to unlock their phones. 
Specifically, law enforcement may try to compel suspects to 
(1) disclose their passcodes orally or in writing, (2) enter a  
passcode without disclosing it, or (3) produce their phones in a 
decrypted form.154 
While compulsion might be technologically simpler than trying 
to break into a phone, it raises difficult legal questions regarding 
the privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, compelling 
suspects to unlock their phones raises two questions: First, is there 
a testimonial communication? Second, does the foregone-
conclusion doctrine apply? Because the analysis may vary 
depending on the type of passcode, PINs and alphanumeric 
passwords are addressed first and biometrics second. 
A. Phones Protected by PINs and Alphanumeric Passwords 
1. Is there a testimonial communication? 
When law enforcement seeks to compel a suspect to unlock a 
phone, the first question that courts address is whether the suspect 
 
 150. Id. at 44–45. 
 151. Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. Id. at 44–45. 
 153. This Note only includes opinions and orders, accessible via Westlaw  
and LexisNexis, from federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and state appellate  
courts. State trial court decisions have been excluded based on their sheer volume  
and inaccessibility. 
 154. Kerr & Schneier, supra note 20, at 1001–02. 
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is making a testimonial communication by unlocking the phone.  
A phone passcode may be testimonial in two different ways. 
First, a passcode may be testimonial if the actual passcode 
explicitly relates a fact. For example, suspected heroin dealers 
would be relating a fact if their passcodes were “ISELLHEROIN.” 
Because this passcode relates a fact that is incriminating, 
compelling it would likely implicate the Fifth Amendment.155 
However, this situation is not probable and has not yet been 
addressed by a court. 
Second, unlocking a phone is testimonial if the act of producing 
the passcode communicates information independent from the 
phone’s passcode. By unlocking a phone, users at the very least 
communicate that they know the passcode to that phone.156 Users 
may also be communicating that they have possession, control, or 
ownership over the phone.157 
But the act of unlocking a phone may not be testimonial if there 
is no dispute that the suspect owns the phone and if the suspect is 
not asked to reveal the password to law enforcement.158 For 
example, an FBI agent asked a suspect to unlock a phone and the 
suspect did so, without telling or showing the agent the 
password.159 The Fourth Circuit said: “Certainly, [the suspect] has 
not shown that her act communicated her cell phone’s unique 
password.”160 This was because the phone’s ownership was never 
in dispute and the suspect “simply used the unexpressed contents 
of her mind to type in the passcode herself.”161 But the court 
ultimately resolved this issue on other grounds, meaning it did not 
 
 155. This type of passcode would not implicate the Fifth Amendment, however, if the 
passcode were typed in by the user and not disclosed to the government. Orin S. Kerr, 
Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 779 (2019). 
 156. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012); Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 
614 (Mass. 2014). 
 157. See, e.g., Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346; Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 614. 
 158. United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied  
sub nom. Popoola v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1212 (2020), and cert. denied sub nom.  
Ogundele v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1213 (2020), and cert. denied sub nom. Popoola v. United 
States, 140 S. Ct. 2554 (2020). 
 159. Id. at 308. 
 160. Id. at 309. 
 161. Id. 
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make a ruling on whether the suspect had made a testimonial 
communication.162 
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, most courts do find 
that the act of unlocking phones is a testimonial communication.163 
To support this conclusion, some courts reference Justice Stevens’s 
safe analogy from his Doe dissent.164 Applying this analogy to 
phones, some courts have stressed that passcodes are not like a key 
because passcodes are not physical items.165 Rather, passcodes are 
contained within a person’s mind, like a safe combination.166 Thus, 
requiring suspects to reveal or use their passcodes also requires 
them to reveal the contents of their minds.167 
One court, however, has questioned the relevance of this 
analogy.168 While the safe analogy may be useful for physical 
documents, the court reasoned, it does not translate well to modern 
phone technology.169 Unfortunately, the Court did not provide 
analysis on why it does not translate well.   
Fortunately, others have analyzed why this analogy may no 
longer be applicable. For example, two scholars argue that “[l]ike 
many attempts to compare the digital and the physical worlds, the 
safe analogy has some intuitive appeal, but it only tells part of the 
story.”170 The analogy “only tells part of the story” because phone 
passcodes encrypt and decrypt the data they protect; safe 
combinations do not.171 For another scholar, the analogy is 
unhelpful because it states a truism—obviously, revealing a safe 
combination is testimonial because it “is a statement of a person’s 
 
 162. Id. at 309–10. 
 163. See infra notes 180, 221. In all of these cases, the courts determined that the act of 
unlocking a phone was a testimonial communication. 
 164. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012); G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1061  
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 548 (Pa. 2019). 
 165. E.g., Davis, 220 A.3d at 548 (“There is no physical manifestation of a password, 
unlike a handwriting sample, blood draw, or a voice exemplar.”). 
 166. Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346; G.A.Q.L., 257 So. 3d at 1061; Davis,  
220 A.3d at 548. 
 167. Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346; G.A.Q.L., 257 So. 3d at 1061; Davis,  
220 A.3d at 548. 
 168. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Price & Simonetti, supra note 22. 
 171. Id. 
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thoughts revealed to the government.”172 A suspect can  
decrypt a phone, however, without revealing the passcode to  
the government.173 
Another consideration is the difference between unlocking and 
decrypting a phone. As explained above, most phones today 
encrypt when they are locked.174 This means that a phone’s contents 
are unreadable until a user enters the passcode, which releases  
a more complex decryption key that makes the contents  
readable again.175 
However, only two courts have addressed the 
unlocking/decrypting distinction, and they found that it did not 
impact the analysis. A federal district court in Washington, D.C., 
asserted that the distinction is not relevant because decryption “is 
accomplished by the machine” and there is no evidence that it 
“requires any mental effort by the [suspect].”176 Likewise, a Florida 
district court of appeal held that the distinction “is of no 
consequence” because decryption “is simply an abbreviated means 
of decrypting the phone’s contents.”177 Neither court delved more 
into the analysis.178 Thus, this distinction does not seem like it will 
be dispositive in most cases, but that could change as more courts 
address this issue. 
Regardless of whether a court finds the safe analogy or the 
unlocking/decrypting distinction persuasive, it will undoubtedly 
find that unlocking a phone is testimonial because when suspects 
unlock a phone they communicate that they know the passcode.179 
2. Does the foregone-conclusion doctrine apply? 
Next, courts must determine if the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine applies, thus making the act of production  
non-testimonial. This issue is where courts differ the most—not just 
in how they answer the question but also in how they frame the 
question. Specifically, courts are split on whether, for the exception 
 
 172. Kerr, supra note 155, at 782. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See text accompanying supra notes 20–37. 
 175. Id. 
 176. In re Search of [Redacted] D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 538 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 177. G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1062 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) 
 178. Id.; In re Search of [Redacted] D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d at 538. 
 179. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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to apply, the forgone conclusion must be the suspect’s knowledge 
of the phone’s passcode or the suspect’s knowledge of the  
phone’s contents. 
a. Courts that apply the foregone-conclusion doctrine when the 
government can independently prove that the suspect knows the  
phone’s passcode.  
Some courts have held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine 
applies when the government can independently prove that the 
suspect knows the phone’s passcode.180 Arguably, when a suspect 
unlocks a phone, that suspect is only communicating that they 
 
 180. In re State’s Application to Compel M.S. to Provide Passcode, No. A–4509–18T2, 
2020 WL 5498590, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2020) (holding that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine applies when the suspect’s ownership and control of phone is not 
disputed); State v. Andrews, 234 A.3d 1254, 1274 (N.J. 2020) (holding that “although the act 
of producing the passcodes is presumptively protected by the Fifth Amendment, its 
testimonial value and constitutional protection may be overcome if the passcodes’ existence, 
possession, and authentication are foregone conclusions”); State v. Pittman, 452 P.3d 1011, 
1020 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the “state did not need to establish, however, that the 
contents of the iPhone were a foregone conclusion”), review allowed, 458 P.3d 1121 (Or. 2020); 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 710 (Mass. 2019) (holding that “the only fact 
conveyed by compelling a defendant to enter the password to an encrypted electronic device 
is that the defendant knows the password . . . .”); State v. Johnson, 576 S.W.3d 205, 227 (Mo. 
Ct. App.) (holding that foregone conclusion applied because the only “facts conveyed 
through [the suspect’s] act of producing the passcode were the existence of the passcode, his 
possession and control of the phone’s passcode, and the passcode’s authenticity”), transfer 
denied (June 25, 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 472 (2019); United States v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-
00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018) (holding that “the government 
need only show it is a foregone conclusion that [the suspect] has the ability to decrypt the 
devices”); In re Search of a Residence in Aptos, California 95003, No. 17-mj-70656-JSC-1, 2018 
WL 1400401, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (holding “that if the [suspect’s] knowledge of the 
relevant encryption passwords is a foregone conclusion, then the Court may compel 
decryption under the foregone conclusion doctrine”); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 88 
N.E.3d 1178, 1182 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (holding that foregone conclusion applied because 
“the Commonwealth knew that a PIN code was necessary to access the iPhone, that the 
[suspect] possessed and controlled the iPhone, and that the petitioner knows the PIN code 
and is able to enter it”); State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment was not implicated because “the State established, with 
reasonable particularity, its knowledge of the existence of the passcode, [the suspect’s] 
control or possession of the passcode, and the self-authenticating nature of the passcode”); 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 615 (Mass. 2014) (holding that the “facts that 
would be conveyed by the [suspect] through his act of decryption—his ownership and 
control of the computers and their contents, knowledge of the fact of encryption, and 
knowledge of the encryption key—already are known to the government and, thus, are a 
‘foregone conclusion’”); United States v. Gavegnano, 305 F. App’x 954, 956 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that any “self-incriminating testimony that [the suspect] may have provided by 
revealing the password was already a ‘foregone conclusion’ because the Government 
independently proved that [the suspect] was the sole user and possessor of the computer”). 
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know the phone’s passcode.181 So, the argument goes, the foregone-
conclusion doctrine applies if law enforcement can independently 
prove that the suspect knows the phone’s passcode. If so, the 
compulsion adds “little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information,”182 and the Fifth Amendment is  
not implicated. 
In one of the earlier cases applying this reasoning, 
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine applied because 
the Commonwealth could independently prove that the suspect 
had ownership over the locked devices and knowledge of the 
devices’ encryption keys.183 Here, an attorney was arrested on 
suspicion that he was carrying out a fraudulent mortgage 
scheme.184 When he was arrested, law enforcement seized several 
computers185 that were encrypted and password protected.186  
Law enforcement officers were not able to circumvent the 
encryption, and the attorney would not unlock the devices, 
although he did confirm his ability to decrypt them.187 The 
Commonwealth then moved to compel the attorney to decrypt the 
devices, which the judge denied, citing the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.188 
On appeal, the court held that the Fifth Amendment did not 
protect the attorney from entering the decryption keys because the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine applied.189 The court said, “The facts 
that would be conveyed by the defendant through his act of 
decryption—his ownership and control of the computers and their 
contents, knowledge of the fact of encryption, and knowledge of 
the encryption key—already are known to the government and, 
 
 181. Although it may be probable that knowledge of a phone’s passcode and 
knowledge of its contents are synonymous, it is not certain. For example, suspects could have 
been told the passcode by someone else, or they could have not accessed the phone for  
some time. 
 182. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
 183. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 615. 
 184. Id. at 609–10. 
 185. Although this case is about computers, not phones, the Fifth Amendment analysis 
is the same. 
 186. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 610. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 611. 
 189. Id. at 615. 
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thus, are a ‘foregone conclusion.’”190 In other words, the 
Commonwealth already knew the attorney could decrypt the 
computers, so the attorney would not be communicating any new 
information by entering the passcode. Here, the court is clear that 
the focus of the analysis should be whether it is a foregone 
conclusion that the suspect knows the passcode.191 
An important question at this stage is how the government can 
prove it “knows” the suspect can unlock the phone. In some cases, 
like Gelfgatt, suspects may confirm their ability to unlock a phone. 
In other cases, however, the government may have to prove that 
knowledge with supplemental evidence. For example, in State v. 
Stahl, a Florida district court of appeal held that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine applied because the State proved, via the 
suspect’s own admissions and phone records, that the suspect 
knew the phone’s passcode.192 In Stahl, police arrested a man they 
believed was using his phone to take inappropriate pictures of 
women.193 The man denied taking the pictures and gave police 
permission to search his iPhone, which was at his house.194  
When the suspect refused to unlock the iPhone, the State moved to 
compel him to do so.195 The trial court denied the motion on  
Fifth Amendment grounds, and the State appealed.196 
On appeal, the court held that the State could compel the 
suspect to unlock his phone. The court held that the State had 
“established that it knows with reasonable particularity that the 
passcode exists, is within the accused’s possession or control, and is 
authentic.”197 The State established the suspect knew the passcode 
because he had earlier identified the phone as his, and the phone’s 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 193. Id. at 127. 
 194. Id. at 128. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 136 (emphasis in original). The State established that a passcode exists simply 
by stating that the phone could not be unlocked without a passcode. Id. Further, the court 
held that, with locked phones, “we must recognize that the technology is self-
authenticating—no other means of authentication may exist.” Id. In other words, the 
passcode is authenticated when the suspect enters it into the phone. 
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number and service provider matched those listed on the suspect’s 
cellphone-carrier records.198 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Jones, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court listed several pieces of information to support its 
holding that the Commonwealth had independently proved the 
suspect’s knowledge of the phone’s passcode.199 In Jones, the 
suspect was arrested for trafficking a person for sexual servitude.200 
When police arrested the suspect, they seized a locked LG phone 
from his person.201 When the suspect refused to unlock the phone, 
the Commonwealth moved to compel the suspect to provide the 
passcode; this was denied.202 On appeal, the court held that the 
suspect could be compelled to enter the passcode because his 
knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion.203 
The court relied on several pieces of evidence to find that the 
suspect’s knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion.204 
First, the woman who reported the suspect told police that the 
suspect regularly used an LG phone to contact her.205 She also 
showed the police her phone, which had the LG’s number listed 
under the suspect’s name in her contacts list.206 The subscriber 
information for the LG had a listed backup number; that backup 
number belonged to the suspect.207 Using cell-site location records, 
the police were also able to show that the suspect and the LG were 
in the same locations at various times.208 Finally, the court found it 
important that the LG was on the suspect’s person when he was 
arrested.209 The totality of the evidence was enough to convince the 
court that the suspect had knowledge of the passcode.210 
To counteract this evidence, the suspect claimed that the 
Commonwealth had to prove he had exclusive control over  
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d 605, 717 (Mass. 2014). 
 200. Id. at 706. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 707. 
 204. Id. at 717. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
6.URESK_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/11/2021  1:03 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:2 (2021) 
626 
 
the phone.211 The suspect pointed to evidence that others also used 
the phone to show that he was not the LG’s sole owner.212 The court, 
however, held that the Commonwealth did not have to prove sole 
or exclusive ownership.213 Rather, it only had to prove the suspect’s 
knowledge of the passcode.214 
Another important question is the burden of proof that the 
government must meet. In Stahl, the court held that the government 
has to know that the suspect can unlock the phone, but it does not 
have to have “perfect knowledge.”215 Specifically, the court 
identified the standard as whether the government can know this 
information with “reasonable particularity.”216 The court did not 
expressly define what level this standard is, nor have other courts 
that have adopted this standard.217 Alternatively, some courts have 
set the standard at “clear and convincing evidence”218 or “beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”219 However, “reasonable particularity” is the 
more common standard.220 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting United States 
v. Greenfield, 831 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Where the location, existence, and 
authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents 
of the individual’s mind are not used against him, and therefore no Fifth 
Amendment protection is available.”); In re Search of a Residence in Aptos, California 95003, 
No. 17-MJ-70656-JSC-1, 2018 WL 1400401, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (“Finally, the 
government’s showing of independent knowledge must be made to the standard of 
‘reasonable particularity.’”); State v. Pittman, 452 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (“That 
is why it matters whether the government has identified the documents with ‘reasonable 
particularity’ in the subpoena.”). 
 218. United States v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *3  
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018) (“The question, accordingly, is whether the government has shown 
by clear and convincing evidence that [the suspect’s] ability to decrypt the three devices is a 
foregone conclusion.”). 
 219. Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 714 (Mass. 2019) (“[F]or the foregone 
conclusion to apply, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knows the password.”). 
 220. This is likely because there is United States Supreme Court and federal circuit 
court precedent that uses the phrase “reasonable particularity.” United States v. Hubbell,  
530 U.S. 27, 30 (2000); Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1344; In re Grand Jury Subpoena,  
Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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In short, some courts will compel suspects to unlock phones if 
the government can independently prove that the suspect knows 
the passcode. Usually, the government must prove this with 
“reasonable particularity.” This independent knowledge can be 
proved in a variety of ways. The easiest way is if suspects confirm 
their ability to unlock a phone. Absent that confirmation, law 
enforcement can rely on a variety of evidence to prove knowledge 
of the passcode; for example, the phone was found on the suspect, 
another person can connect the suspect to the phone,  
cell-site location records connect the suspect to the phone, and 
cellphone-carrier records also connect the suspect to the phone. 
b. Courts that apply the foregone conclusion doctrine only when  
the government has demonstrated independent knowledge of the  
phone’s contents.  
Some courts have held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine 
only applies when the government has demonstrated independent 
knowledge of the phone’s contents.221 This requires law 
 
 221. Varn v. State, No. 1D19–1967, 2020 WL 5244807, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 
2020) (holding that the focus of the foregone-conclusion doctrine “is whether the State has 
identified with reasonable particularity the evidence it seeks within the passcode-protected 
cell phone”); Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958 (Ind. 2020) (holding that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine did not apply because “the State has failed to demonstrate that any 
particular files on the device exist or that [the suspect] possessed those files”); 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 551 n.9  (Pa. 2019) (holding that even if the foregone 
conclusion-doctrine could apply, the “Commonwealth must establish: (1) the existence of the 
evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of the evidence by the defendant; and (3) 
the authenticity of the evidence”); Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 649, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019) (holding that the foregone-conclusion doctrine only applies if “the state can describe 
with reasonable particularity the information it seeks to access on a specific cellphone. . . .”), 
reh’g denied (Dec. 23, 2019), review dismissed No. SC20–110, 2020 WL 1491793 (Fla. Mar. 25, 
2020); People v. Spicer, 125 N.E.3d 1286, 1291 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (holding that “the proper 
focus” of the foregone-conclusion doctrine “is not on the passcode but on the information 
the passcode protects”); G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) 
(holding that “the object of the foregone conclusion exception is not the password itself, but 
the data the state seeks behind the passcode wall”); SEC v. Huang, No. CV 15–269, 2015 WL 
5611644, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2015) (holding that the foregone-conclusion doctrine did not 
apply because the SEC had no evidence that “any of the documents it alleges reside in the 
passcode protected phones”); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) 
(holding that a phone password was not a foregone conclusion because “it is not known 
outside of [the suspect’s] mind” and that the Commonwealth could not compel decryption 
because “the existence and location of the [phone’s contents are] not a foregone 
conclusion.”); Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1346 (holding that the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine did not apply because “[n]othing in the record before us reveals that the 
Government knows whether any files exist and are located on the hard drives . . . .”);  
In re Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06–MJ–91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009) 
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enforcement to describe what information it expects to find on the 
locked phone. Because only two courts using this approach have 
concluded that a suspect’s knowledge of a phone’s content was a 
foregone conclusion, it is hard to know for certain how much detail 
a court would require before granting a motion to compel. 
The leading case on this approach—which requires law 
enforcement to prove that the device’s contents are a foregone 
conclusion—is Grand Jury Subpoena from the Eleventh Circuit.  
In this case, law enforcement seized several laptops and external 
hard drives from the hotel room of a suspected child 
pornographer.222 The government was unable to access some 
portions of the drives, which were encrypted.223 So a grand jury 
issued a subpoena requiring Doe to decrypt the hard drives and 
any “containers or folders” that might be on the drives.224  
Doe claimed that complying with the subpoena would violate his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.225 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Doe and held that he could 
refuse to comply with the subpoena on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.226 Specifically, the court held that “the Government has 
failed to show any basis, let alone shown a basis with reasonable 
particularity, for its belief that encrypted files exist on the drives, 
that Doe has access to those files, or that he is capable of decrypting 
the files.”227 To successfully compel Doe to decrypt the drives, the 
government would have to prove that it knew “what, if anything, 
was hidden behind the encrypted wall.”228 For example, the 
government would have to prove the existence and location of files 
that it expected to find.229 
Most courts that hold the foregone-conclusion doctrine only 
applies when the government proves independent knowledge of 
the phone’s contents closely follow the Eleventh Circuit’s 
reasoning. For example, in People v. Spicer, an Illinois appellate 
 
(holding that the foregone conclusion doctrine applies because the “Government . . . knows 
of the existence and location of the Z drive and its files”). 
 222. Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F.3d at 1339. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1349. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1346. 
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court carefully tracked the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning. Here, the 
suspect was a passenger in a vehicle pulled over for speeding.230 
During the stop, officers found cocaine where the suspect was 
sitting.231 Officers arrested the suspect and, during a search incident 
to arrest, seized a phone on his person.232 The suspect refused to 
provide the phone’s passcode, and the State filed a motion to 
compel him to do so, which was denied.233 
On review, the court upheld the denial because the State did not 
establish that the phone’s contents were a foregone conclusion.234 
While the State did request categories of information, like call logs 
and text messages, it did not “identify any documents or specific 
information.”235 Relying heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis, 
the court held that the Fifth Amendment protected the suspect from 
unlocking the phone.236 
One court, however, has applied an even stricter standard than 
the Eleventh Circuit. In Commonwealth v. Davis, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court suggested that a compelled phone unlock would 
always violate the Fifth Amendment. In Davis, police seized the 
computer of a suspected child pornographer.237 The computer was 
locked and encrypted, and the suspect confirmed he was the sole 
owner of the computer and knew the password.238  
The Commonwealth filed a motion to compel him to unlock the 
computer, which the trial court  granted.239 However, on appeal,  
the state supreme court denied the motion.240 Referring to the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine, the court said: “Indeed, we conclude 
the compulsion of a password to a computer cannot fit within this 
exception.”241 This suggests that the court would, in all situations, 
find it a Fifth Amendment violation to compel suspects to unlock 
their phones. The court did, however, note that even if it found the 
 
 230. People v. Spicer, 125 N.E.3d 1286, 1288–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1292. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A.3d 534, 538 (Pa. 2019). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 539. 
 240. Id. at 550. 
 241. Id. 
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foregone-conclusion doctrine could apply, it would require the 
Commonwealth to identify the specific files it expects to find on  
the device.242 
Similarly, in Eunjoo Seo v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court 
detailed three reasons why it believes application of the foregone-
conclusion doctrine to phones is “concerning.”243 In this case, which 
was explained in the introduction, the State requested permission 
to compel a suspect to unlock her phone; previously, law 
enforcement had done a forensic download of the same phone.244 
The court denied the request, finding that the State failed to prove 
“that (1) the suspect knows the password; (2) the files on the device 
exist; and (3) the suspect possesses those files.”245 Although a 
detective could describe generally what apps and evidence he 
expected to find on the phone, the court held this was not enough 
because the State needed to be able to describe “particular files.”246 
The court further said that even if the police could describe 
particular files, they would be granted access only to those files and 
not the entire phone.247 
After denying the State’s request, the court continued with a 
discussion of why it found the foregone-conclusion doctrine 
“concerning” in this context.248 First, the court said that 
“[s]martphones are everywhere and contain everything” and are 
thus unlike the business documents that are traditionally covered 
by the foregone-conclusion doctrine.249 Second, it predicted that 
allowing the foregone-conclusion doctrine to apply to phones 
would essentially allow law enforcement “unbridled access” to 
potential evidence.250 Third, the court argued that U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent counsels against this application of the doctrine, 
noting that the “Supreme Court has hesitated to apply even 
entrenched doctrines to novel dilemmas.”251 
 
 242. Id. at 551 n.9. 
 243. Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 958–62 (Ind. 2020). 
 244. Id. at 953–54. 
 245. Id. at 957. 
 246. Id. at 958. 
 247. Id. at 960. 
 248. Id. at 959–62. 
 249. Id. at 959. 
 250. Id. at 960. 
 251. Id. at 961. 
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Here, the court’s reasoning strongly suggests that situations 
where the foregone-conclusion doctrine would permit law 
enforcement to compel a phone unlock are exceptional, at least  
in Indiana. 
At the writing of this Note, only two courts had used this 
foregone-conclusion approach and found that the Fifth 
Amendment was not implicated. 
In Varn v. State, the State moved to compel Varn to disclose his 
cellphone password because it suspected he was transmitting child 
pornography.252 Because law enforcement officers had already 
searched the phone of someone that Varn messaged with, they 
were able to detail what they expected to find on Varn’s phone.253 
For example, they could recite texts “verbatim” and give “detailed 
and graphic descriptions of seven still images and two video 
screenshots depicting child pornography.”254 
On review, a Florida district court of appeal held that the 
specific information the officers provided was enough to satisfy the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine.255 This was because the officers were 
able to describe with “reasonable particularity” the evidence it 
expected to find on the phone.256 Notably, the court said that it 
would not always require this “level of specificity . . . to trigger the 
foregone conclusion exception.”257 But it did not attempt to explain 
exactly what level of specificity it requires.258 
In Boucher II,259 an Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Special Agent, trained in recognizing child pornography, searched 
the laptop of a passenger stopped at the U.S.-Canada border.260 
While examining the laptop’s contents, the agent identified several 
files as child pornography.261 The agent arrested the passenger and 
 
 252. Varn v. State, No. 1D19–1967, 2020 WL 5244807, at *2–3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  
Sept. 3, 2020). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at *3. 
 255. Id. at *4. 
 256. Id. at *3–4. 
 257. Id. at *4. 
 258. See id. 
 259. This case is labeled Boucher II to distinguish it from another case that is discussed 
later. See supra notes 371–379 and accompanying text. 
 260. In re Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1–2 (D. Vt.  
Feb. 19, 2009). 
 261. Id. at *2. 
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shut down the laptop.262 Later, the government tried to re-access 
the files but could not because the laptop’s “Z” drive—where  
the pornography was located—was encrypted. A grand jury 
subpoenaed the passenger for the laptop’s passcode, but the 
passenger moved to quash, and the magistrate judge granted  
the motion.263 
On appeal, the court held that the Fifth Amendment was not 
implicated because the files sought on the Z drive were a foregone 
conclusion.264 First, the court noted that, in order for the foregone-
conclusion doctrine to apply, the government must establish 
independent knowledge of the “existence and location” of the files 
sought.265 The government met that burden, the court concluded, 
because the agent had already seen the files on the Z drive and 
could explain them and their location.266 Ultimately, providing 
access to those files would not add anything to the government’s 
information, and the forgone-conclusion doctrine applied.267 
As with the first approach—which focuses on the suspect’s 
knowledge of the passcode—courts focusing on the phone’s 
content must decide what burden of proof the government must 
meet. The Eleventh Circuit held that the government must be able 
to describe the device’s contents with a “reasonable 
particularity.”268 Unlike the first approach, where there was some 
variation in the burden of proof, all cases following this approach 
that identify a burden identify that burden as “reasonable 
particularity.”269 This is likely because, unlike with the first 
approach, all the cases following this approach have a circuit court 
decision to follow that clearly defines a burden of proof. As with 
the first approach, however, courts have not given much guidance 
on what “reasonable particularity” means. 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at *1–2. 
 264. Id. at *3. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 269. In re Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 
2009); People v. Spicer, 125 N.E.3d 1286, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); Pollard v. State, 287 So. 3d 
649, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); G.A.Q.L. v. State, 257 So. 3d 1058, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2018); SEC v. Huang, No. 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2015). 
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In review, some courts will not grant a motion to compel a 
phone unlock unless the government can describe with reasonable 
particularity the phone’s contents. This approach—in comparison 
to the approach that focuses on the suspect’s knowledge of the 
passcode—makes it less likely that the government will 
successfully compel the unlock. Because courts almost always find 
that the foregone-conclusion doctrine does not apply in these 
scenarios, it is hard to know what evidence is enough. But a court 
is more likely to find that the foregone-conclusion doctrine applies 
if the government has actually seen the phone’s contents and can 
therefore describe the content and its location. 
c. Courts that have not clearly chosen one approach.  
Three courts—an intermediate state court, a federal circuit 
court, and a federal district court—have not clearly chosen  
one approach.270 
 In Garcia v. State, a Florida district court of appeal held that the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine did not apply, but it did not say what 
the focus of that doctrine should be.271 The court first explained that 
United States Supreme Court precedent does not support applying 
the foregone-conclusion doctrine when the compelled testimony is 
oral testimony.272 The court had two reasons for this. First, it 
thought “that it would be imprudent” to extend the doctrine 
beyond the limited application of Fisher v. United States.273 Second, 
it believed that the foregone-conclusion doctrine would almost 
always apply in phone-unlock cases because it is usually clear that 
the suspect owns the phone.274 This, the court explained, would be 
a “death knell” to Fifth Amendment protections.275  
In the case before the court, the State was compelling the 
suspect to orally reveal his passcode; thus, the court said the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine could not apply.276 While the court 
was clear that the foregone-conclusion cannot apply when a 
 
 270. See Garcia v. State, No. 5D19–590, 2020 WL 5088056, at *5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 
28, 2020); United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d 238, 242–44 (3d Cir. 2017);  
United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 271. Garcia, 2020 WL 5088056, at *4–5. 
 272. Id. at *4. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 724 (Lenk, J., concurring)). 
 276. Id. at *5. 
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suspect is compelled to orally reveal a passcode, it did not address 
other situations—like compelling a suspect to unlock a phone with 
biometrics or produce a decrypted phone.277 
The Third Circuit heard an appeal from a suspect who was held 
in contempt for failing to comply with an order to decrypt his 
laptop and external hard drives.278 Because the suspect did not 
preserve his Fifth Amendment claims in the trial court, the Third 
Circuit reviewed the lower court’s decision for plain error.279 
Ultimately, the court held that the lower court did not err in 
holding the suspect in contempt for failing to comply with the 
order.280 In a footnote, the court clarified that it was not necessarily 
concluding that the devices’ contents are the correct focus of the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine.281 It also acknowledged that “a very 
sound argument” can be made that the proper focus is the 
government’s ability to prove the suspect knows the passcode.282 
Because its review was limited to plain error, the court clarified that 
it “need not decide here that the inquiry can be limited to the 
question of whether [the suspect’s] knowledge of the password 
itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion 
doctrine.”283 Thus, in the Third Circuit, at least, the question of the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine’s proper scope is left for another day. 
In United States v. Fricosu, a federal district court in Colorado 
held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine applied when the 
government moved to compel a suspect to produce a decrypted 
laptop.284 Rather than picking one approach, the court found both 
that the government had independent knowledge of the existence 
and location of files on the laptop and that the suspect was the sole 
owner and possessor of the laptop.285 
Admittedly, the court in Fricosu spent more time explaining the 
evidence that demonstrated that the suspect could decrypt  
 
 277. See id. at *5 n.2 (declining to address whether the State could compel a suspect to 
unlock a phone with biometrics). 
 278. Apple MacPro Comput., 851 F.3d at 243–44. 
 279. Id. at 244. 
 280. Id. at 249. 
 281. Id. at 248 n.7. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 285. Id. 
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the laptop.286 The court also held that the government’s inability to 
describe “the specific content of any specific documents is not a 
barrier to production.”287 This may suggest that the court is leaning 
towards the first approach, which only requires that the 
government has independent knowledge that the suspect knows 
the passcode.288 However, the Fricosu court cites the Boucher II 
decision—where a federal district court in Vermont held that the 
phone’s contents should be the focus of the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine—so it is not clear that the court clearly chose one 
approach.289 It is also possible that because this was an earlier 
decision (from 2012), and the issue was fairly new, the court did not 
feel the need to clearly pick one approach. Given the court’s 
ambiguity, this decision does not fall squarely into either of the two 
main categories. 
Another interesting aspect of the Fricosu decision is the burden 
of proof that the court used. Rather than using “reasonable 
particularity,” as many other courts do, the court in Fricosu  
held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine applied based on  
a “preponderance of the evidence.”290 The court did not explain 
why it chose this standard but simply stated that was the 
appropriate standard.291 
d. Is there a clear trend?  
As of the writing of this Note, twenty-one cases addressed this 
issue.292 Of those twenty-one cases, eleven held that the focus of the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine must be the suspect’s knowledge of 
the passcode.293 Ten held that the phone’s contents must be the 
focus.294 Three did not clearly choose one approach.295 Courts are 
therefore far more likely to pick one of the two main approaches. 
But there is not a clear “majority view.” Particularly because the 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See supra notes 180, 221, 270 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
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sample size is not large, it would be unwise to claim that one 
approach is more favored. 
Further, there is not a clear trend suggesting that one approach 
is becoming more popular and that the other is falling out of favor. 
As Figure 1 shows, this issue became more prevalent starting in 
2018. That year, more courts focused on the suspect’s knowledge of 
the passcode. In 2019, three courts focused on the suspect’s 
knowledge of the passcode, while a different three courts focused 
on the government’s knowledge of the phone’s contents. In 2020, 
the courts are likewise evenly split, with one court not clearly 
choosing one approach. As with above, these numbers do not 
suggest a particular trend, especially given the small sample size. 
 









2009 1 case 1 0 
2012 0 1 1 
2013 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 
2015 0 1 0 
2016 1 0 0 
2017 1 0 1 
2018 2 1 0 
2019 3 3 0 
2020 2 2 1 
Figure 1 
 
It is also not clear that the type of court is germane. As Figure 2 
shows, intermediate state appellate courts are the most likely to 
address this issue. Also, the different court systems are evenly 
split—with the exception of the highest state appellate courts, 
which have one more case deciding that the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine applies if the government can independently prove that 
the suspect knows the passcode.   
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5 5 1 
Figure 2 
 
It is possible that, in the coming years, one approach will trend 
more and become the majority approach. This would certainly be 
true if the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. For now, 
however, it is difficult to predict how a given court will decide. 
B. Phones Protected by Biometrics 
Unlike with PINs and alphanumeric passwords, the analysis for 
biometrics is centered on whether the act is testimonial and not 
whether the foregone-conclusion doctrine applies. Because 
biometric passcodes use physical characteristics, multiple courts 
have held that compelling suspects to unlock their phones with 
fingerprints is not testimonial, and thus the Fifth Amendment does 
not apply. Some courts, however, have held that unlocking a phone 
with a fingerprint is a testimonial communication. The following 
sections address each approach in turn. 
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1. Courts that have held biometrics are not testimonial296 
Some courts hold that suspects can be compelled to unlock their 
phones using biometric passcodes.297 The reasoning is that using a 
biometric is a purely physical act that does not require suspects to 
divulge the contents of their minds.298 In that regard, suspects can 
be compelled to unlock their phones via biometrics, just as they can 
be compelled to stand in a lineup, wear certain clothes, and submit 
to fingerprinting. 
In Commonwealth v. Baust, the first case to address a compelled-
biometric phone unlock, the Circuit Court of Virginia held that a 
suspect could not be compelled to produce his phone’s passcode.299 
He could, however, be compelled to produce his fingerprint to 
 
 296. There are only two jurisdictions where courts have held that compelling a suspect 
to unlock a phone via a PIN or password is a testimonial communication, but that compelling 
a suspect to unlock a phone via biometrics is not a testimonial communication. State v. Stahl, 
206 So. 3d 124, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 271 
(2014). This contrast is likely not meaningful, however, because all jurisdictions that have 
addressed PIN and password compulsion have held that there was a testimonial 
communication. See supra Section III.A.1. Thus, a contrast will exist in any jurisdiction where 
a court holds that biometrics are not testimonial. 
 297. In re Search Warrant No. 5165, No. 5:20-MJ-5165, 2020 WL 3581608, at *10 (E.D. Ky. 
July 2, 2020) (holding that “[t]he use of biometrics might be compelled and might also be 
incriminating, but neither of these things make it testimonial”); In re Search Warrant 
Application for Cellular Tel. in U.S. v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Ill. 2019) 
(holding that a “biometric procedure is first and foremost a physical act” and thus not 
testimonial); In re Search of a White Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 
F. Supp. 3d 785, 794 (D. Idaho 2019) (holding that requiring a suspect to unlock a phone with 
a fingerprint does not “violate the Fifth Amendment because it does not require the suspect 
to provide any testimonial evidence”); In re Search of [Redacted] D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 
540 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that the compelled use of a suspect’s biometric features was non-
testimonial); State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. 2018) (holding that “providing a 
fingerprint to unlock a cellphone is not a testimonial communication under the Fifth 
Amendment”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2003 (2018); In re Search Warrant Application for 
[Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (holding that “requiring the 
application of the fingerprints to the sensor does not run afoul of the self-incrimination 
privilege because that act does not qualify as a testimonial communication”); Stahl, 206 So. 3d 
at 135 (“Compelling an individual to place his finger on the iPhone would not be a protected 
act; it would be an exhibition of a physical characteristic, the forced production of physical 
evidence, not unlike being compelled to provide a blood sample or provide a handwriting 
exemplar.”); Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271  (holding that a “fingerprint like a key, however, does 
not require the witness to divulge anything through his mental processes”). 
 298. Notably, almost all cases refer specifically to using the suspect’s fingerprints. One 
court, however, gave authorization to compel the suspect’s “fingerprints, face, or irises” to 
unlock any devices found on the searched premises. In re Search of [Redacted] D.C.,  
317 F. Supp. 3d at 540. 
 299. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. at 271. 
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unlock the phone.300 This would not implicate the Fifth 
Amendment because it “does not require the witness to divulge 
anything through his mental processes.”301 Thus, requiring the 
suspect to put his fingerprint on a phone does not “communicate 
any knowledge” and is non-testimonial.302 
Similarly, in State v. Diamond, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
listed two reasons for finding that a fingerprint is non-
testimonial.303 First, the suspect was only compelled to provide the 
fingerprint “for the physical, identifying characteristics of [the 
suspect’s] fingerprint, not any communicative testimony inherent 
in providing the fingerprint.”304 So providing the fingerprint was 
just like standing in a lineup or giving a voice exemplar.305 Second, 
providing the fingerprint did not reveal the content of the suspect’s 
mind.306 The court noted that the suspect did not have to self-select 
what fingerprint would be used307 and could have even been 
unconscious for the whole process.308 
A federal district court in Kentucky also held that biometrics are 
not testimonial and emphasized their mindless nature.309 The court 
reasoned that requiring suspects to use their biometrics does not 
require them to reveal the contents of their minds.310 The court 
explained that even though using biometrics requires suspects to 
do something, “it requires nothing more than the [suspects] looking 
in a particular direction or placing their body parts in a certain 
place.”311 Thus, the court determined that the Fifth Amendment 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 875–76 (Minn. 2018). 
 304. Id. at 875. 
 305. Id. at 875–76. 
 306. Id. at 876. 
 307. Other courts have found it relevant that law enforcement officers, and not the 
suspect, selects which fingers are applied to the phone’s sensors. In re Search of A White 
Google Pixel 3 XL Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 F. Supp. 3d 785, 793 (D. Idaho 2019); 
In re Search of [Redacted] D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 539 (D.D.C. 2018); In re Search Warrant 
Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 803–804 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 308. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d at 877. 
 309. In re Search Warrant No. 5165, No. 5:20-MJ-5165, 2020 WL 3581608, at *10 (E.D. Ky. 
July 2, 2020). 
 310. Id. at *9. 
 311. Id. at *10. 
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does not protect suspects from being compelled to unlock their 
phones via biometrics.312 
2. Courts that have held biometrics are testimonial 
Other courts, however, have held that using biometrics to 
unlock a phone is a testimonial communication.313 All of these 
courts emphasize that cellphones are new technology and carry  
a vast array of invasive, detailed information. Each court’s  
Fifth Amendment analysis, however, is slightly different. For that 
reason, each case is explained in turn. 
In United States v. Wright, the most recent case, a federal district 
court in Nevada held that a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated when law enforcement “forcibly unlocked his 
smartphone . . . by holding it up to his face.”314 The court reasoned 
that “a biometric feature is functionally the same as a passcode, and 
because telling a law enforcement officer your passcode would be 
testimonial, so too must the compelled use of your biometric 
feature to unlock a device.”315 Here, the court makes it clear that it 
sees no distinction between a PIN or alphanumeric password and 
a biometric passcode. 
The court offered no commentary on what the government 
would have to prove in order for the foregone-conclusion doctrine 
to apply. Arguably, the court would hold that the government only 
has to prove the suspect knows the passcode because the court said 
 
 312. Id. 
 313. United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Nev. 2020) (holding that 
“unlocking a phone with your face equates to testimony that you have unlocked the phone 
before, and thus you have some level of control over the phone”); In re Search of a Residence 
in Oakland (Residence in Oakland), 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that 
“if a person cannot be compelled to provide a passcode because it is a testimonial 
communication, a person cannot be compelled to provide one’s finger, thumb, iris, face, or 
other biometric feature to unlock that same device”); United States v. Warrant, No. 19-mj-
71283-VKD-1, 2019 WL 4047615, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019) (holding “that requiring an 
individual to use a biometric feature to unlock an electronic device so that its contents may 
be accessed is an act of production that is inherently testimonial in the context of a criminal 
investigation”); In re Application for a Search Warrant (Application for a Search Warrant), 236 
F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (holding that the use of biometrics to unlock a phone 
is testimonial because with the “touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has 
accessed the phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint password capabilities, 
and that he or she currently has some level of control over or relatively significant connection 
to the phone and its contents”). 
 314. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. 
 315. Id. at 1187. 
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that “unlocking a phone with your face equates to testimony that 
you have unlocked the phone [using a passcode] before, and thus 
you have some level of control over the phone.”316 But that is far 
from a clear statement. 
In United States v. Warrant, a federal district court in California 
held that biometrics could not be compelled unless specific 
conditions were met.317 As in Wright, the court here found “no 
meaningful distinction between unlocking a device with a 
password and unlocking a device with a biometric feature.”318 The 
court did, however, say that the foregone conclusion doctrine may 
apply if two conditions are met: “(1) the device is found on the 
person of one of the [suspects]”319 and “(2) as to a particular device, 
law enforcement personnel have information that the particular 
individual who is compelled to apply his or her biometric feature(s) 
has the ability to unlock that device, such that his or her ability to 
unlock the device is a foregone conclusion.”320 
So the court in Warrant applied the stricter biometric standard 
by saying that biometrics are testimonial and thus covered by the 
Fifth Amendment.321 But the court also used the less strict foregone-
conclusion doctrine; that is, the court only required the government 
to prove that a suspect had the ability to unlock a particular device; 
it did not require the government to show independent knowledge 
of the phones’ contents.322 
In contrast to Warrant, a federal district court in Illinois held that 
the foregone-conclusion doctrine would only apply if the 
government had independent knowledge of the phone’s 
contents.323 In Application for a Search Warrant, the government 
requested permission to apply the fingerprints of any person found 
on the search premises to any Apple devices found during the 
search.324 The federal district court held that this type of 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Warrant, 2019 WL 4047615, at *4. 
 318. Id. at *2. 
 319. Id. at *4. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at *2. 
 322. Id. at *4. 
 323. In re Application for a Search Warrant (Application for a Search Warrant),  
236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 324. Id. at 1067. 
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compulsion did relate a factual assertion.325 “With a touch of a 
finger,” the court said, “a suspect is testifying that he or she has 
accessed the phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint 
password capabilities, and that he or she currently has some level 
of control over or relatively significant connection to the phone and 
its contents.”326 Thus, the act of putting a fingerprint on a 
cellphone’s sensor is a testimonial communication.327 
The court next addressed whether the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine applied and held that it did not. The court held that in 
order for the foregone-conclusion doctrine to apply, the 
government would have to have independent knowledge of the 
“existence and nature of the electronic information sought.”328 
Because the government did not establish this, the court denied the 
motion to compel.329 
A federal district court in California used the same reasoning as 
Application for a Search Warrant, but also cast doubt on whether the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine could ever apply.330 In Residence in 
Oakland, the government requested a search warrant to seize digital 
devices found at a home.331 The government also requested 
permission to compel any individuals at the home to provide their 
biometrics “for the purposes of unlocking the digital devices 
found.”332 The request was not limited to any particular person or 
device.333 The court held that this would be requiring a testimonial 
communication.334 The court also noted that this act would be 
different from other non-testimonial acts—such as submitting to a 
DNA swab or fingerprinting—for two reasons.335 First, the 
biometric features would be serving the same function as a 
passcode—unlocking a device to secure content.336 Second, using 
 
 325. Id. at 1073. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 1074. 
 329. Id. 
 330. In re Search of a Residence in Oakland (Residence in Oakland), 354 F. Supp. 3d  
1010, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 331. Id. at 1013. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1014. 
 334. Id. at 1015–16. 
 335. Id. at 1015. 
 336. Id. 
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biometrics in this way would communicate information, namely 
that a person has ownership or control over the device.337 
The court also held that the foregone-conclusion doctrine did 
not apply and that for the doctrine to apply the government would 
have to show “prior knowledge of the existence or the whereabouts 
of the documents ultimately produced.”338 Notably, the court 
seemed skeptical that this standard could ever be met because 
smartphones “contain large amounts of data . . . the full contents of 
which cannot be anticipated by law enforcement.”339 Ultimately, it 
is unclear whether this court would ever hold that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine does apply. 
To summarize, some courts have held that suspects can be 
compelled to unlock phones using biometrics because biometrics 
are purely physical characteristics that are non-testimonial. Other 
courts, however, have held that biometrics are testimonial and will 
not grant a motion to compel unless the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine applies. Among the courts holding that biometrics are 
testimonial, there is no clear consensus on what the government 
must prove in order for the foregone-conclusion doctrine to apply. 
3. Court that has not clearly chosen one approach 
There is also a federal district court in Virginia that has not 
clearly chosen one approach.340 In this case, the government 
requested permission to unlock a suspect’s phone using either the 
suspect’s finger or face.341 The court acknowledged that other 
courts are split on whether the use of biometrics is testimonial and 
said that “[n]o clear consensus has emerged” on this issue.342 The 
court granted the request, which may suggest that the court 
decided that using biometrics is not testimonial.343 But the court did 
not say the act was nontestimonial.344 Rather, the court stated its 
 
 337. Id. at 1016. 
 338. Id. at 1017. 
 339. Id. 
 340. In re Search Warrant, 437 F. Supp. 3d 515, 516 (W.D. Va. 2020). 
 341. Id. at 515. 
 342. Id. at 516. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
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reasoning for granting the request was that “the data on any 
electronic device may be lost if not unlocked in a timely manner.”345 
Given that all other courts to address this issue have specifically 
decided whether the act is testimonial or nontestimonial, this case 
seems more like an outlier than a potential trendsetter. 
4. Is there a clear trend? 
As with PINs and passwords, there is no clear majority 
approach. Of the thirteen cases addressing these issues, there are: 
eight cases where the court held that biometrics are not 
testimonial;346 four cases where the court held that biometrics are 
testimonial;347 and one case where the court did not clearly choose 
one approach.348 
Although twice as many courts have held that biometrics can 
be compelled, the sample size is small, and the legal landscape 
could shift drastically as more cases are decided. There also is not a 
clear trend in one direction; of the two cases decided in 2020 that 
clearly chose an approach, one found that biometrics did not 
implicate the Fifth Amendment, while the other found that they 
did. As Figure 3 shows, there is no clear trend in one direction: 
 
Year Not testimonial Testimonial No clear 
approach 
2014 1 case 0 0 
2016 1 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 
2018 2 0 0 
2019 2 2 0 
2020 1 1 1 
Figure 3 
 
It is also not clear that court system is germane. As Figure 4 
shows, federal district courts are almost evenly split on this issue. 
Notably, no state appellate courts have held that the use of 
 
 345. Id. 
 346. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
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biometrics is testimonial—only federal district courts have reached 
that conclusion. But again, it is hard to tell if those trends are 








0 cases 0 0 
Federal 
District Court 









2 0 0 
Figure 4 
 
Given the small universe of cases and the varying analysis, it is 
difficult to surmise how a court addressing this for the first time 
would decide. 
C. Additional Factors That May Influence a Court’s Decision 
A court may consider other factors, in addition to or as part of 
the testimonial-communication and foregone-conclusion analyses, 
when deciding whether to grant a motion to compel. Two 
important factors that a court may consider are (1) is the prosecutor 
offering immunity and (2) what specifically the prosecutor wants 
to compel. 
1. Is the prosecutor offering immunity? 
Some courts have held that—where a communication is 
testimonial and the foregone-conclusion doctrine is not met—the 
government may still compel a passcode if the suspect is offered 
immunity. But the caselaw on this issue is sparse and courts have 
disagreed on what the scope of the immunity should be. 
Specifically, some courts only require “act-of-production” 
immunity, while others require “derivative-use” immunity. 
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Act-of-production immunity only precludes the government 
from using the suspect’s actions to prove the existence, 
authenticity, and custody of the requested information.349 With this 
immunity, the government is still able to use the information it 
collects against the suspect.350 Derivate-use immunity, however, 
precludes the government from using the information gathered 
against the suspect.351 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Hubbell, held that a 
suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated because only act-
of-production immunity was offered.352 In this case, a grand jury 
issued a subpoena requiring Hubbell to turn over eleven categories 
of documents.353 Hubbell complied with the subpoena, but only 
after the government got a court order granting Hubbell 
immunity.354 A dispute arose, however, regarding the scope of that 
immunity.355 The government argued that the immunity only 
covered the act of production―meaning the immunity only 
precluded the government from using Hubbell’s actions to prove 
the existence, authenticity, and custody of the documents.356 
Hubbell, however, argued that the government could also not 
make derivative use of the documents’ contents—meaning the 
government could not use the documents against him at trial.357 
The Supreme Court sided with Hubbell. It held that the 
documents’ contents could not be used against Hubbell in a 
criminal prosecution unless the government could show “that the 
evidence it used in obtaining the indictment and proposed to use at 
trial was derived from legitimate sources ‘wholly independent’ of 
the testimonial aspect of respondent’s immunized conduct in 
assembling and producing the documents described in the 
subpoena.”358 Because the government could not make that 
 
 349. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40–41 (2000). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 32. 
 352. Id. at 45–46. 
 353. Id. at 31. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 31–32. 
 356. Id. at 40–41. 
 357. See id. at 32. 
 358. Id. at 45. 
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showing, it could not use the documents against Hubbell, even 
with the grant of immunity.359 
The Eleventh Circuit also held that derivative-use immunity is 
necessary to protect a suspect’s rights.360 Here, the grand jury 
subpoena required its target, Doe, to produce unencrypted versions 
of his hard drives.361 The U.S. Attorney requested that the court 
offer Doe immunity, but only for the act of production.362 In other 
words, the immunity would not prevent the government from 
using the contents of the hard drives against Doe in a criminal 
prosecution.363 The trial court granted the order, which Doe 
challenged on appeal.364 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Doe, holding that act-of-
production immunity did not suffice to protect his Fifth 
Amendment rights.365 When it comes to Fifth Amendment rights, 
the court said, derivative-use immunity is the “critical 
threshold.”366 The court also noted that even if the contents 
themselves are not testimonial, act-of-production immunity still 
does not suffice because those contents are still derived from 
testimonial statements.367 Thus, the government could only compel 
Doe to turn over the decrypted hard drives if it offered Doe 
derivative-use immunity.368 
In contrast, a federal district court in Colorado held that a 
suspect could be compelled to produce the decrypted contents of 
her laptop, in part because the suspect was offered immunity that 
precluded the government from using her act of production against 
her.369 But the court in this case also held that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine applied, so it is difficult to say how much the 
grant of immunity affected the case’s outcome.370 
 
 359. Id. at 45–46. 
 360. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011 (Grand Jury 
Subpoena), 670 F.3d 1335, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 361. Id. at 1337. 
 362. Id. at 1338. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. at 1351–52. 
 366. Id. at 1351. 
 367. Id. at 1351–52. 
 368. Id. at 1349–50. 
 369. United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 370. Id. at 1237. 
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In sum, if the foregone-conclusion doctrine does not apply, the 
government may still be able to compel  a phone unlock by offering 
immunity. The necessary scope of that immunity, however, may 
differ depending on the jurisdiction. In jurisdictions where the 
focus of the foregone-conclusion doctrine is just the suspect’s 
knowledge of the passcode, act-of-production immunity may be 
sufficient. But where the phone’s contents are the focus, derivative-
use immunity may be required. 
2. What was the suspect compelled to produce? 
Another issue that some courts, and scholars, find important is 
what specifically the suspect is compelled to do. Suspects can 
potentially be compelled to disclose the passcode, enter the 
passcode without disclosing it, or produce a decrypted device. 
Arguably, if the suspect is compelled to disclose the passcode, 
verbally or in writing, then the act-of-production doctrine does not 
apply and the foregone-conclusion doctrine is unavailable. This is 
because disclosing the passcode would be direct testimony and not 
a production of an already created document or file. 
For example, in Boucher I, a grand jury subpoenaed Boucher to 
enter a passcode to decrypt his hard drive.371 The government 
suggested that Boucher could enter the passcode without “the 
government, the grand jury, or the Court observing or recording 
the password in any way.”372 Boucher, however, maintained that 
this would violate his Fifth Amendment rights.373 
A federal district court in Vermont agreed with Boucher; it held 
that compelling him to enter his passcode was testimonial because 
it would convey the fact that Boucher knows the passcode and has 
control over the laptop.374 Next, the court held that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine could not apply because a passcode is not a 
“physical thing,” but rather something that exists solely in 
Boucher’s mind.375 The court further explained: “This information 
is unlike a document, to which the foregone conclusion doctrine 
usually applies, and unlike any physical evidence the government 
 
 371. In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06–mj–91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1 (D. Vt.  
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06–mj–91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 372. Id. at *2. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at *3. 
 375. Id. at *6. 
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could already know of. It is pure testimonial production rather than 
physical evidence having testimonial aspects.”376 
The government appealed this decision but, learning from its 
earlier misstep, requested that Boucher hand over the decrypted 
contents of the hard drive rather than entering his passcode.377 
Here, the court did assess the foregone-conclusion doctrine and 
found that the government had made the requisite showing.378 
Thus, the court directed Boucher to produce a decrypted version of 
his hard drive.379 Ultimately, then, the court was only willing to 
apply the foregone-conclusion doctrine when the government 
moved to compel the suspect to produce a decrypted device, but 
not to disclose his passcodes. 
Similarly, in United States v. Spencer, a federal district court in 
California held that a suspect could be ordered to turn over his 
decrypted devices but could not be compelled to disclose the 
devices’ passcodes.380 The court reasoned that requiring Spencer  
to disclose the passcode “orally or in writing” would be a 
testimonial communication not covered by the act of production 
and thus self-incriminating.381 
In Garcia v. State, a Florida district court of appeal was explicit 
that it would not apply the foregone-conclusion doctrine if the State 
was trying to compel an oral disclosure of a passcode.382 It said “that 
the foregone conclusion exception or doctrine does not apply to 
compelled oral testimony.”383 The court did not address whether it 
would be willing to compel a suspect to enter a passcode or 
produce a decrypted device.384 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. In re Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06–mj–91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt.  
Feb. 19, 2009). 
 378. Id. at *3. 
 379. Id. at *4. 
 380. United States v. Spencer, No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 26, 2018). 
 381. Id. & n.1. Another court said that if the government moved to compel disclosure, 
the motion “could be considered under the traditional analysis of the self-incrimination 
privilege―that of verbal communications.” State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 133 n.9 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2016). The court, however, did not say whether compelling disclosure of the 
passcode would preclude a foregone-conclusion analysis. Id. 
 382. Garcia v. State, No. 5D19–590, 2020 WL 5088056, at *5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  
Aug. 28, 2020). 
 383. Id. 
 384. See id. at *4–5. 
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, held a 
suspect could be required to enter a passcode, so long as he was not 
compelled to disclose it orally or in writing.385 This differs from 
Boucher I, where the court held that even compelling a suspect to 
enter the passcode outside of the government’s and court’s 
presence would violate the Fifth Amendment.386 
A Massachusetts federal district court took an entirely different 
approach, holding that requiring a suspect to unlock a phone before 
surrendering it still violated the Fifth Amendment.387 In Jimenez, the 
government wanted to access the contents of a suspect’s phone, but 
it admitted that forcing the suspect to disclose the passcode would 
violate the Fifth Amendment.388 So instead the government asked 
that the suspect be ordered to unlock his phone and then relinquish 
it.389 The court denied the request, holding that “[w]hether the 
[suspect] is forced to reveal his passcode or unlock the phone in the 
presence of law enforcement does not impact the analysis; both 
situations would force [the suspect] to ‘disclose the contents of his 
own mind’ and accordingly are testimonial acts violating the Fifth 
Amendment.”390 Thus, the government’s attempts to work around 
the Fifth Amendment were unsuccessful. 
In sum, it could be dispositive that a suspect is being compelled 
to disclose a passcode, enter a passcode, or produce decrypted 
content. However, most courts that have addressed compelled 
phone unlocks have not addressed this specific question. So it is 
difficult to predict how a court tackling this issue for the first time 
would consider the methods employed. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROSECUTORS AND  
LAW ENFORCEMENT  
Because phones, especially those that encrypt, are becoming 
increasingly common, law enforcement officers will likely face 
more scenarios where they need to collect evidence from a locked 
phone. This is difficult in jurisdictions where no court has 
 
 385. Commonwealth v. Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702, 710–11 n.9 (Mass. 2019). 
 386. In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06–mj–91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *6 (D. Vt.  
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06–mj–91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 387. United States v. Jimenez, 419 F. Supp. 3d 232, 233 (D. Mass. 2020). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
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addressed when suspects can be compelled to unlock a phone. In 
those jurisdictions, law enforcement and prosecutors have no clear 
guidance on how to legally collect evidence. Precedent from other 
jurisdictions, however, can offer suggestions for how to proceed. 
The following are recommendations for law enforcement officers 
and prosecutors who would like to compel a suspect to unlock a 
phone but have no controlling legal guidance on the issue. 
First, request to compel the suspect to unlock the device using 
biometrics.391 This is a good starting place because some courts 
have held that placing a fingerprint on a sensor is no different from 
standing in a lineup or submitting to a blood draw. Because 
biometrics are a purely physical key, and do not require the 
government to access the suspect’s mind, there is a persuasive 
argument that there is no testimonial communication. If the court 
agrees, then the parties do not even have to address the foregone-
conclusion doctrine. Thus, starting with biometrics could solve the 
problem in a simple way. 
There are ways to make a biometric request more likely to 
succeed. For one, the government can stipulate that it, and not the 
suspect, will select which fingers to place on the device’s sensors. 
As some courts have noted, this makes this process even more 
“mindless” for the suspect, making it less likely that the act is 
testimonial. Further, the government can produce facts that connect 
the suspect to the phone. This would be helpful if the court is 
inclined to think that using biometrics is testimonial and an act of 
production. In this situation, showing that the suspect has 
possession, control, or ownership of the phone could make the act 
of production a foregone conclusion. Additionally, some courts 
have held that it is a Fifth Amendment violation to require 
everyone at the scene of a search to apply their fingers to any device 
found. Making a request for a particular suspect to apply their 
fingers to a specific phone may make the motion more persuasive. 
But there are drawbacks to using biometrics. To begin with, 
biometrics will not always unlock a phone. If the phone has been in 
police custody for several days, or has not been unlocked for 
several days, it may not unlock unless a PIN or alphanumeric 
password is entered. This could be problematic if law enforcement 
seizes a phone and has to wait for court permission or has to spend 
 
 391. See supra Section III.B. 
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time linking the phone to a particular suspect. Also, if a suspect  
has not entered biometrics into the phone, then biometrics are not  
an option. 
Second, have factual findings connecting the suspect to the 
phone.392 While this might be helpful in biometrics cases, it is 
particularly important in cases where the government is trying to 
compel a PIN or alphanumeric password. Because a court is most 
likely to find that compelling a passcode is testimonial and an act 
of production, the government will need to demonstrate that 
whatever facts the suspect relates are a foregone conclusion.  
A person who unlocks a phone using a passcode at the very least 
conveys knowledge of the phone’s passcode. Thus, the government 
should, at a minimum, be able to demonstrate that the suspect 
knows the passcode. This may also mean demonstrating that the 
suspect has possession, control, or ownership of the phone. 
There are various types of evidence that can demonstrate a 
suspect knows a passcode. The most compelling evidence is if the 
suspect admits knowledge of the passcode. But other evidence may 
be an adequate substitute for that admission. For example, 
appropriate evidence could include the following: the phone was 
found on the suspect; the phone is registered in the suspect’s name; 
a third party testifies that the phone belongs to the suspect; the 
suspect has previously said that he or she can unlock the phone; 
and phone records connect the phone to the suspect. While a court 
will perhaps not find any of these dispositive, a combination of 
them could likely demonstrate that the suspect knows the 
passcode. The prosecution can also make its motion more 
compelling by arguing that it has demonstrated the suspect’s 
knowledge with a “reasonable particularity.” Since this is the 
standard that the majority of courts have adopted, other courts may 
be willing to adopt it as well. 
A deficiency of this approach, however, is that a court may not 
find this evidence sufficient to satisfy the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine. A court may decide that the government has to prove the 
phone’s contents—and not just the suspect’s knowledge of the 
passcode—are a foregone conclusion. If that is the case, then this 
evidence will not satisfy the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 392. See supra Section III.A.2.a. 
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Third, be able to describe the phone’s contents as much as 
possible.393 This could be describing messages, photos, or videos 
that the government expects to find on the phone. It could also be 
explaining what apps are on the phone and what evidence that app 
contains. This evidence could be collected if the government has 
previously seen the phone’s contents or has a third party who can 
describe the contents. The benefit of this approach is that it is the 
highest standard; if the government can describe the phone’s 
contents, a court is very likely to find that the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine applies. 
This approach, however, will likely frustrate law enforcement 
in many situations. Scenarios where law enforcement can describe 
the phone’s content may be few and far between. Further, courts 
vary on how much detail they expect. While many have adopted 
the “reasonable particularity” standard, that phrase does not lend 
much help in understanding exactly how much detail a court  
will require. 
Potentially, a court could decide that, because phones contain a 
vast body of detailed information, the contents can never truly be a 
foregone conclusion. In other words, there is no possible way that 
the government could describe the contents of a phone to the point 
where the government would unlock the phone and not learn any 
new information. This may be particularly true given the Supreme 
Court’s language in Riley v. California. In Riley, the Court held that 
it is generally unconstitutional for law enforcement officers to 
search the contents of an arrestee’s phone without a warrant.394  
The Court noted the “immense storage capacity”395 of smartphones 
and emphasized that “there is an element of pervasiveness that 
characterizes cell phones but not physical records.”396 The Court’s 
warning that smartphones are different from physical records may 
lead other courts to impose a high standard when it comes to 
compelling a suspect to unlock a phone.397 
 
 393. See supra Section III.A.2.b. 
 394. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). 
 395. Id. at 393. 
 396. Id. at 395. 
 397. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court, citing Riley extensively, cautioned 
against the “unbridled access” to information that law enforcement would have if able to 
compel suspects to unlock phones. Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 959–61 (Ind. 2020). 
Additionally, at least two other courts have cited Riley when establishing that the foregone-
conclusion doctrine does not allow the government to compel suspects to unlock phones 
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Fourth, offer immunity for the act of production.398 For 
example, stipulate that the government will not prove that the 
phone belongs to the suspect by entering evidence that the suspect 
unlocked the phone. If the suspect has immunity, the Fifth 
Amendment is not implicated because the communication, even if 
it is compelled and testimonial, is not incriminating. This could 
help assuage a court’s fears that the government has not fully 
established independent knowledge of a suspect’s knowledge of  
a passcode. 
Act-of-production immunity, however, may not be enough for 
some courts. These courts may require that the government also 
offer derivative-use immunity―meaning that the prosecution will 
not use the phone’s contents against the suspect at trial. If it is 
possible to offer this type of immunity without rendering the 
contents useless, then derivative-use immunity could be offered. 
But because the prosecution typically wants to access the phone 
because it believes the contents will be helpful in prosecuting the 
suspect, derivative-use immunity may not be practical. 
Fifth, do not request that the suspect disclose the passcode 
orally or in writing.399 Requesting that the suspect disclose the 
passcode may make the foregone-conclusion doctrine unavailable. 
This is because a court may find that disclosing the passcode is a 
verbal communication and not an act of production, and the 
foregone-conclusion doctrine is only available as an exception to 
the act-of-production doctrine. 
If law enforcement has control of the device, the prosecution 
could request that the suspect enter the passcode. It could also 
stipulate that the suspect will enter the passcode in privacy, 
without law enforcement watching or recording. This makes it 
more likely that the suspect is only relaying information via the  
 
with biometric features. In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073 
(N.D. Ill. 2017); United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 n.9 (D. Nev. 2020). Other 
courts, however, discussed Riley but still found that a suspect could be compelled to unlock 
a phone via biometrics. In re Search of [Redacted] D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 539–40 (D.D.C. 
2018); In re Search Warrant No. 5165, No. 5:20-MJ-5165, 2020 WL 3581608, at *14 (E.D. Ky. 
July 2, 2020); In re Search Warrant Application for Cellular Tel. in U.S. v. Barrera,  
415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2019); In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 
279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 806–807 (N.D. Ill. 2017). Thus, some courts may find Riley essential to 
their decision on this issue, while others may not. 
 398. See supra Section IV.C.1. 
 399. See supra Section III.C.2. 
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act of production, which makes the foregone-conclusion  
doctrine available. 
If law enforcement does not have the phone in custody, it could 
request that the suspect turn over a decrypted version of the phone. 
Again, this would be an act of production because the suspect is 
relaying information through the act of producing evidence. 
The difficulty with having the suspect unlock the phone is that 
it reduces the government’s control over the phone. Potentially, the 
suspect could sabotage the phone. For example, the suspect could 
repeatedly enter an incorrect passcode until the phone erases all 
data. Or the suspect could remove data before turning it over.  
That is a possibility that law enforcement will have to consider.  
CONCLUSION 
Returning to Hamilton County, and Seo’s locked phone, the 
State moved to compel Seo to unlock her phone.400 Seo still refused, 
and the State moved to hold her in contempt.401 Seo appealed, 
claiming her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
and the contempt order was stayed.402 The court of appeals held 
that Seo could not be compelled to unlock her phone, but the  
State appealed.403 
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals, 
holding that Seo’s Fifth Amendment rights would be violated if she 
were compelled to unlock her phone.404 The court chose a strict 
interpretation of the foregone-conclusion doctrine, explaining that 
it would only apply if the State could describe the “particular files” 
on Seo’s phone.405 But the court did not stop there. Instead, it gave 
an itemized explanation of why it believes the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine is ill-suited for compelled-phone-unlock cases.406 
 
 400. Seo, 148 N.E.3d at 954. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 953. 
 405. Id. at 958. 
 406. Id. at 958–62. 
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Seo demonstrates the complexity of these cases―they involve 
old law, new technology, constitutional rights, and competing 
interests. For now, law enforcement officers and prosecutors in 
jurisdictions without guiding precedent can develop best practices 
using the available cases. 
 
